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Discrimination against women based on the fact that they are women is a deeply rooted practice in all 
societies. However, the level of discrimination varies greatly with the level of development of the given society 
and strongly influences and vice versa it is influenced by the status of women in a given society. Addressing 
this gender-based discrimination is a difficult task because it is closely linked to the concept of equality, and 
state’s action and inactions. The article establishes that the States parties’ obligation is to ensure that there is 
no direct or indirect discrimination against women in their laws, sanctions, and other remedies and those 
women are protected against discrimination in the public, as well as, in the private spheres.  
 











Discrimination against women based on the fact that they are women is a deeply 
rooted practice in all societies. However, the level of discrimination varies greatly with the 
level of development of the given society and strongly influences and vice versa is 
influenced by the status of women in a given society. Addressing this gender-based 
discrimination is a difficult task because is closely linked to the concept of equality, and 
state’s action’s and inactions. There are several international legal instruments that starve to 
eliminate discrimination of women in a more systematic way, headed by the CEDAW, the 
ECHR and the quazi-jurisprudence of the ECtHR, and finally the Human Rights Committee 
(HRC) of the ICCPR. The article will analyse the scope of application of the right to be free 
of discrimination, the concept of equality and the positive state obligations stemming from 
the relevant international legal documents, with the aim of showing precisely identified 
positive state obligations that will ultimately lead to the best possible actions on national 
level in forms of laws, policies and measures to eliminate gender based discrimination and 
to achieve actual equality.  
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 1, No. 3, 2016 | UDC 327 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies – Bitola at www.e-jlia.com 
            
21 
 
Scope of application  
 
The CEDAW Convention is designed to redress discrimination against women, 
and explicitly aims to benefit women. (Steiner and Alston 2000, at158) EDAW’s Article 1 
reveals that gender based discrimination is ‘any distinction, exclusion or restriction made 
on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis 
of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, 
economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.’  ( Article 1 1981) The Convention’s 
definition and scope of protection of gender discrimination goes beyond the concept of 
discrimination used in many national and international legal standards and norms as 
acknowledged in the General Recommendation 25 pointing out that while such standards 
and norms prohibit discrimination on the ground of sex, inter alia, and protect both men 
and women from treatment based on arbitrary, unfair and/or unjustifiable distinctions, the 
Convention focuses only on types of discrimination against women, i.e. gender based 
discrimination, emphasizing that women have suffered and continue to suffer from various 
forms of discrimination, only because they are women. (CEDAW 2005) 
 
Concept of equality 
 
Before investigating the definition of discrimination and the concept of this right, 
it is important to explore the concept of equality because it presents a broader, all 
encompassing concept. The term equality is an elusive but very rich one because it has 
many different but interrelated dimensions: discrimination, affirmative action, equality 
before the law, and equal protection of the law-to name the major ones (Henrard 2006). 
This equality cannot be achieved by simply erasing any distinction between men 
and women; it calls for taking actions, sometimes even radical ones, with the aim of 
bringing special legal and non-legal measures to ensure de facto and substantive equality 
(Nowak 1993). In 1990, Asbjorn Eide and Torkel Opsahl opined that non-discrimination 
was the only road to reaching the vague idea of equality (Eide and Opsahl 1990). Similarly, 
under the international law, the concept of equality can be said to incorporate two 
meanings-the principle of non-discrimination that propels governments to refrain from 
differentiating on unlawful, arbitrary and unreasonable grounds, and the principle of 
protection or adoption of special measures in order to achieve actual or substantive equality 
(McKean 1985). The concept of ‘actual’ equality, understood in a broader sense, could 
mean the assumption of ‘sameness’-that is to say treating the same cases in same manner 
and thus, not making a differentiation (McKean 1985). This translates into the non-
discrimination requirement or the prohibition of the law on discrimination on basis of sex, 
race, and religion. However, with respect to the second meaning of the concept of equality, 
certain exceptions pertaining certain groups could be said to justify the accepting of the fact 
that there are differences among the ‘same’ cases (Wentholt n.d). For example, even though 
treating women and men equally in a formal sense is the general requirement and ensures 
formal equality, the disadvantaged position of women in societies and the different 
characteristics of the women vis-à-vis men (pregnancy, child birth, children etc.), could be 
justification enough to adopt a different treatment in order to achieve substantive equality 
cases (Wentholt n.d). This, in other hand, would mean acceptance that like cases in a 
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formal sense could be treated as unlike cases in a substantive sense; more specifically, in a 
way that allows reflection of their differences (Mulder n.d) or as Henrard observes: “full 
equality acknowledges differences in starting positions which might necessitate differential 
treatment in order to reach real, effective equality.” (Henrard 2006). 
This distinction between formal and substantive equality has been on the agenda of 
legal literature in recent times. The essence of substantive equality has been argued and 
understood differently by various authors; however, Mulder points out that it implies a right 
to better material conditions and social opportunities for those who have fallen behind 
(Mulder 1999). The European Court of Human Rights has expanded its non-discrimination 
jurisprudence by pointing at the issue of substantive equality in the case of Thlimmenos v. 
Greece (2000). However, it is important to investigate to what extent the prohibition of 
discrimination furthers substantive equality. This arguably depends (inter alia) on the 
extent to which the supervisory body recognizes indirect discrimination and an obligation 
to differentiate and also on the evaluation of affirmative action measures in relation to the 
prohibition of discrimination (Henrard 2006). 
Not every differentiation amounts to a prohibited discrimination. (McKean 2002) 
Understanding substantive equality as the starting point of gender protection allows us to 
see the extent to which the supervisory body recognizes the indirect discrimination, an 
obligation to differentiate, and the evaluation of affirmative action measures (in relation to 
the prohibition of discrimination). Finally, in view of the pervasiveness of discrimination 
against women, it is also important to assess to what extent the prohibition of 





In order to establish the positive obligation on states it is paramount to look at the 
quazi-jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Namely, the ECtHR uses certain criteria in addressing 
complaints of discrimination (Ovey and White, 2002). The first criteria would be the 
establishment of whether the complaint of discrimination falls within the sphere of a 
protected right. Article 14 of the ECHR prohibiting discrimination is a parasitic provision 
(1998). It has always been looked at by the Court in conjunction with some other 
substantive right (Henrard 2006). The Court has described the prohibition of discrimination 
in Article 14 as autonomous in meaning but an accessory in applications (Rasmussen v 
Denmark 1984): 
‘71. According to the Court's established case-law, Article 14 (art. 14) 
complements the other substantive provisions of the Convention and the 
Protocols. It has no independent existence since it has effect solely in 
relation to "the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms" safeguarded by those 
provisions. Although the application of Article 14 (art. 14) does not 
necessarily presuppose a breach of those provisions - and to this extent it is 
autonomous -, there can be no room for its application unless the facts at 
issue fall within the ambit of one or more of the latter. (Abdulaziz, Cabales 
and Balkandali v The United Kingdom 1985).  
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However, the new Protocol 12 broadens the scope of application of Article 14, so 
that it is no longer parasitic by needing to invoke it along with another right. However, this 
extension only applies to the conduct of public authorities and does not extend to private 
persons (Explanatory Report n.d). The modern approach is to consider a complaint of a 
violation of Article 14 read together with the substantive provision, if there is clear 
inequality in treatment in the enjoyment of the right in question as a fundamental aspect of 
the case (Burghartz v Switzerland 1994). Even though it is no longer required that the right 
in combination with which article 14 is invoked is also violated in itself (Belgian 
Linguistics n.d), the Court, after finding violation of the substantive article, no longer has 
the duty to investigate the discrimination complaint (McKean 1985). The second criteria 
would pose itself as the question of whether there is s different treatment. 
The jurisprudence of the ECtHR stresses the use of a comparability test that 
requires the proof of a differential treatment of persons that are comparable in relation to 
the norm making the differential treatment. (Henrard 2006) The HRC often seems to use 
this test (VandenHole 2005). However, this test is often not actually used (Inze v Austria 
1987) by the Court, or it is replaced by a disadvantage test (Elsholz v Germany 2000). The 
latter test requires the proof of a differential treatment, which results in considerable 
disadvantage for the claimant. Whether the disadvantage is serious enough depends on the 
exact circumstances of the case. 
In the case of Thlimmenos v Greece (2001) the Court held that Article 14 is also 
violated when States without objective and reasonable justification fail to treat differently 
persons whose situations are significantly different. This aspect of Article 14, may help in 
an argument for reasonable adjustments. Only a differential treatment of sufficiently 
comparable cases is reviewed under the justification test. The starting point is to consider if 
the applicants can prove that they have been treated less favorably than the group that is 
being compared with based on identified characteristics.  
However, the comparability test does not always produces positive results, 
especially when differential treatment concerns situations are said not to be comparable. 
(Henrard 2006) A case that illustrates this is Van der Musel v Belgium (1983), where the 
applicant unsuccessfully argued that the comparators are different professional groups. But 
comparability issues cannot be totally neglected; the prohibition of discrimination can be 
violated when there is no differential treatment of situations, which are not comparable, 
without reasonable and objective justification. (Henrard 2006) As Henrard observes: “this 
obligation to differentiate as flowing from the prohibition of discrimination simply contains 
the reverse situation and hence would require a proof of the absence of differential 
treatment of not comparable situations.” (Henrard 2006). Where the differential treatment is 
between men and women, as in Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom 
(1985), weighty reasons are required by the Court to justify the differential treatment 
(Vierdag n.d). 
The next criteria is to see whether the treatment pursue a legitimate aim. In 
arguing a legitimate aim for differential treatment, the respondent State has to show the 
nature of the legitimate aim pursued and the link between the legitimate treatment and that 
legitimate aim (Ovey and White 2002). The European Court of Human Rights, since the 
Belgian linguistics case, has created a jurisprudence in which it points out that a difference 
of treatment only amounts to a prohibited discrimination if it has no objective and 
reasonable justification-that is if it does not pursue ‘a legitimate aim (Belgian Linguistic 
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case 1968). In regard to the requirement of a legitimate aim, it should be noted that in 
contrast to the doctrine of legitimate limitations, Article 14 does not contain a limitative 
enumeration of possible legitimate aims (Henrard 2006). Where limitation on the rights in 
Articles 8-11 is expressly authorized, a State cannot limit the right in a discriminatory way, 
even though by doing so would not violate the substantive article where the limitation is 
legitimate, but it will violate Article 14 (Grandrath v Federal Republic of Germany). The 
European Court of Human Rights has not enumerated or imposed substantive requirements 
as to the type of aim that was invoked by states. There are some cases in which the Court 
has identified some substantive requirements, such as in Buchen v Czech Republic (2002). 
The aim should be in line with the foundational principles of a democratic society. This 
relationship between differentiation and the legitimate aim pursued has been further 
clarified by the Court. The Court has emphasized that the distinction made should be 
pertinent and adequate or relevant to the achievement of the legitimate aim. However, even 
though this requirement of pertinence is often distinguished from the proportionality test, 
they are closely connected in a way that “when the legitimate aim is not sufficiently related 
to the differential treatment, the measure complained of shall not pass the proportionality 
test either.” (Henrard 2006). Finally, the last criteria examines whether the means employed 
are proportionate to the legitimate aim and does the difference of treatment goes beyond the 
State’s margin of appreciation? In the Belgian linguistics case (1968), the European Court 
of Human Rights stated that a difference of treatment only amounts to a prohibited 
discrimination if there is not a ‘reasonable relationship of proportionality between the 
means employed and the aim sought to be realized (Belgian linguistics case 1968). This 
was also confirmed in Lithgow and others v United Kingdom (1986). 
First of all, proportionality requires there to be a reasonable relation between the 
legitimate aim on the one hand and the differential treatment on the other hand. In other 
words, differential treatment should not go beyond what is strictly necessary in order to 
achieve the goal (Karner v Austria 2003). In the case law of the ECtHR, the presence of 
this proportionality test implies the grant of a certain margin of appreciation to the 
contracting states. It is exactly the extent of this margin of appreciation in a particular case, 
which determines (more or less) the outcome. Where a limitations on the rights 8-11 is 
expressly authorized, a State cannot limit the right in a discriminatory way, even though 
doing so would not violate the substantive article where the limitation is legitimate, but will 
violate Article 14 (Grandrath v Federal Republic of Germany). As said before, the width of 
choice available to States to introduce laws that could be discriminatory is based on the 
context. For example, in cases of discrimination based on sex, the margin of appreciation 
does not exist. Consequently, it is very difficult to prove no violation as in Karlheinz 
Schmidt v Germany (1994). The ECtHR, in Nachova v Bulgaria (2005), has said that in 
cases of discrimination, the Court may require the respondent government to disprove an 
arguable allegation of discrimination. If they fail to do so the Court may find a violation of 
Article 14 of the Convention on that basis. 
CEDAW’s prohibition of discrimination only concerns the grounds of ‘gender.’ 
Since it is not parasitic it has a broader field of application (Smith 2005), with respect to 
women than the ECHR. The Convention acknowledges indirect horizontal application-thus 
protecting individuals from interference with their right by non-state actors. For example, 
Article 11 of the CEDAW requires parties to the Convention to enact measures that will 
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eliminate discrimination in employment. Furthermore, the CEDAW includes the obligation 
to promote-a provision, which blurs the public private divide (Steiner and Alston 2000). 
 
Types of discrimination: direct and indirect discrimination 
 
Discrimination can be direct and indirect. Direct discrimination affects certain 
groups within society, in this case women, through clear stipulated laws and policies that 
differentiate between groups, for example, on bases on sex. An illustration would be the 
introduction of policies that restrict women’s freedom of movement. 
It is important that the prohibition of discrimination also targets indirect 
discrimination. However, indirect discrimination is hard to detect because it occurs when a 
neutral criterion, which in reality affects persons of (for example) different sex, is used 
(Heringa). According to Schultz et al, “indirect discrimination occurs when a practice, rule, 
requirement, or condition is neutral on its face, but impacts disproportionately upon 
particular groups.” (Tobler 2005). Heringa observes that indirect discrimination can be 
realised in bad intention hidden behind objective criteria referring to different selection 
criteria on the basis of sex for example, or it can be in good faith when requiring certain job 
skills that exclude women. However, in the end, it is not the intention that matters, but the 
effect of the measure or law in question because the effect that indirect or direct 
discrimination against women has on women and their lives in a given country, pushes 
them to migrate in search for better life, whereas the intention could be argued either way. 
The HRC has been contradictory in its recognition of the indirect discrimination, 
as seen from its conflicting decisions (Henrard 2006) in Ballantyne et al v Canada (1993) 
and Diergaardt v Namibia (2000) concerning the impact of prohibition of the use of 
languages. In the first case the HRC was oblivious to the indirectly discriminatory impact 
of a measure and did not take into account concerns about indirect discrimination. 
However, relatively recently, the HRC has fully acknowledged the phenomenon of indirect 
discrimination (General Comment no 16 2005), in Althammer v Austria (2001) and in 
Derksen v the Netherlands (2001): 
The Committee recalls that a violation of article 26 can also result from the 
discriminatory effect of a rule or measure that is neutral at face value or 
without intent to discriminate. However, such indirect discrimination 
(emphasis added) can only be said to be based on the grounds enumerated in 
Article 26 of the Covenant if the detrimental effects of a rule or decision 
exclusively or disproportionately affect persons (emphasis added) having a 
particular race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status (…)” (Althammer v 
Austria 2001). 
  
Even though the Committee remarks that a certain measure is neutral on its face 
and does not have any intent to discriminate, it concludes that this measure nevertheless 
results in discrimination because of its exclusive or disproportionate adverse effects on a 
certain category of persons. The HRC seems to use exactly the same model of review as in 
cases of direct discrimination and seeks to establish whether or not the ‘distinction’ (which 
must refer back to the disproportionate impact) is based on ‘reasonable and objective 
criteria’ (Henrard 2006). The European Court of Human Rights, even though initially very 
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reluctant to recognize indirect discrimination, has recently expanded its non-discrimination 
jurisprudence by considering the issue of indirect discrimination in the case of Thlimmenos 
v. Greece (2000). However, the ECtHR is still struggling with the creation and application 
of the appropriate model of review to the extent that it seems to continue to question the 
concept of indirect discrimination. An example of this is the case of Abdulaziz, Cabales 
and Balkanda (1985) where the Court said that it would be virtually impossible to 
successfully rely on indirect discrimination, since it classified as irrelevant the disparate 
impact on certain groups (because of their typical characteristics) of, on first impression 
neutral rules (Henrard 2006). The Court tended to give a strong impression of not 
investigating thoroughly enough whether a certain measure could indirectly have 
discriminatory effects because it neglected the broader context determining the position of 
the people concerned when it assessed the alleged discriminatory treatment. (Schutter) The 
latter is particularly problematic in cases of systemic discrimination, as is the case in 
regarding minorities like the Roma (Buckley v UK 1996). However, in the recent case of 
Kelly v UK (1996), the Court explicitly acknowledged “where a general policy or measure 
has disproportionately prejudicial effects on a particular group, it is not excluded that this 
may be considered as discriminatory notwithstanding that it is not specifically aimed or 
directed at that group.” (Kelly v UK 2001).  
Progress was made in this direction by the admissibility decision in Hoogendijk v 
the Netherlands (2005), in the Courts reasoning with respect to the issue of ‘indirect 
discrimination.’ The Court indicated that “although statistics are not automatically 
sufficient for disclosing a practice which could be classified as discriminatory under Article 
14” statistics could be used, as it is no longer ruled out that statistical evidence would do in 
order to establish a ‘prima facie’ case. In this case, the Court proposed a model to assess 
complaints of indirect discrimination by indicating that “where an applicant is able to show, 
on the basis of undisputed official statistics, the existence of a prima facie indication that a 
specific rule – although formulated in a neutral manner – in fact affects a clearly higher 
percentage of women than men, it is for the respondent government to show that this is the 
result of objective factors unrelated to any discrimination on the ground of sex.” 
(Hoogendijk v. Netherlands 2005). 
Similarly, CEDAW/C relying on the extensive definition in Article 1 of the 
Convention has taken the position that the prohibition includes both direct and indirect 
discrimination by public as well as, private actors. CEDAW, General Recommendation 25 
states (General recommendation No. 25 2005): 
Indirect discrimination against women may occur when laws, policies and 
programmes are based on seemingly gender-neutral criteria which in their 
actual effect have a detrimental impact on women. Gender-neutral laws, 
policies and programmes unintentionally may perpetuate the consequences 
of past discrimination. They may be inadvertently modeled on male 
lifestyles and thus fail to take into account aspects of women’s life 
experiences which may differ from those of men. These differences may 
exist because of stereotypical expectations, attitudes and behavior directed 
towards women, which are based on the biological differences between 
women and men. They may also exist because of the generally existing 
subordination of women by men. 
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In other words, the States parties’ obligation is to ensure that there is no direct or 
indirect discrimination against women in their laws, sanctions, and other remedies and that 
women are protected against discrimination committed by public authorities, the judiciary, 
organizations, enterprises or private individuals in the public as well as, the private spheres. 
It is important to point out that while the direct discrimination against women is 
easier to spot (such as the gender based violence ignored by State legislation) indirect 
discrimination may be present and closely linked to the issue of achieving substantive 
equality. This means that even though States adopt laws, which are not discriminately but 
equal in form, they do not achieve substantive equality because of the negative impact these 
apparently neutral rules have on a specific group. For example, having to work a certain 
amount of shifts is an obligation and right of all men and women; however, this legal 
provision certainly targets pregnant women or women with children in a negative way by 
creating a disadvantaged position with respect to the labour market. This active and passive 
requirement of non-discrimination in achieving equality must be comprehensively 
implemented by governments in order to fulfil the negative and the positive State 
obligations arising from the rights proscribed in the international human rights instruments 
relating to freedom from discrimination. Furthermore, in fighting the overall discrimination 
of women providing of not only formal but also substantive equality for women it is an 
important tool. The elimination of direct discrimination and efforts to eliminate indirect 
discrimination against women will eliminate the root factors to many harmful practices that 
affect women., and will greatly improve the status of women if societies (United Nations 




The CEDAW has produced the most comprehensive definition of gendered based 
discrimination against women and has offered all encompassing international legal 
standards in order to eliminate discrimination against women. The ECHR also in Article 
14, provides prohibition of discrimination and the Court uses several criteria in its 
assessment whether there is discrimination in cases of individuals against states. However, 
it is very important to note that, in order to fight discrimination its important to achieve 
equality, i.e. substantial equality as theorized by many human rights authors. In order to do 
so it is necessary to establish the positive state obligation in the private sphere as well as, in 
the public sphere, as analyzed by the HRC of the ICCPR, vis-à-vis discrimination against 
women based on gender, and to differentiate between direct and indirect discrimination. 
These efforts will ultimately lead towards better legal regulation that ensures substantial 
equality of women; permits affirmative action; and strives towards promotion of status of 
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